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Abstract
Using a model of nonlinear decay of the stock pollutant, and starting from the same initial conditions,
the paper shows that an optimal tax that corrects for both stock and ￿ow externalities may result in a
lower tax, fewer cumulative emissions (less decay) and higher output at the steady state than a corrective
tax that ignores the ￿ow externality. The ￿more is less￿ result emphasizes that setting a corrective tax
that ignores the ￿ow externality, or imposing a corrective tax at too low a level where there exists only
a stock externality, may aﬀect both transitory and steady state output, tax payments and cumulative
emissions. The result has important policy implications for decision makers setting optimal corrective
taxes and targeted emission limits whenever stock externalities exist.
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Pigouvian taxes are widely used to mitigate the externalities that exist in production. Such
taxes are favored when there exist many polluters and have been widely applied in Europe
to address a large number of environmental externalities (Andersen 1994; OECD 1992).
Worldwide, corrective taxes generate billions of dollars annually for governments. In theory,
corrective charges should equal the costs imposed on society of a de￿ned level of pollution. In
practice, charges are often based on the notion that the current level or ￿ow of pollution (such
as the amount of phosphorous discharged into a river) represents the externality imposed
on society. However, many pollutants impose both stock and ￿ow externalities such that
current and cumulative discharges aﬀect the non-monetary variables of utility or production
functions (Baumol and Oates 1988).
Much of the literature on Pigouvian taxes focuses either on ￿ow externalities or stock
externalities (Sinclair 1992; Ulph and Ulph 1994; Farzin and Tahvonen 1996; Hoel and
Kverndokk 1996; Wirl and Dockner 1996). Where both stock and ￿ow externalities exist
and are explicitly considered (Sandal and Steinshamn, 1998), the optimal corrective tax
will exceed the shadow cost of pollution for a given level of pollution (Wirl, 1994; Farzin
1996). Thus, we would expect that a corrective tax which ignores ￿ow externalities, when
they are present, to result in more pollution and a lower tax payment. By contrast, our
paper shows that diﬀerent taxes result in diﬀerent time paths and that the speci￿cation of
the decay function of the stock of pollution has an important aﬀe c to nb o t ht h et r a n s i t o r y
and steady-state production, taxes and emissions. Moreover, the possibility exists that the
optimal tax that corrects for both ￿ow and stock externalities may result in a steady state
with higher emissions, but lower accumulated pollution and lower tax payments than a tax
that only corrects for the stock externality. A case of more is less. A similar result may
also occur whenever there is a propensity to set the corrective tax at too low a level in the
presence of a stock externality, whether or not ￿ow externalities exist.
The ￿more is less￿ result will only occur if the decay of the pollution stock is a non-
monotone function of accumulated pollution. By contrast, most of the economic literature
on pollution assume linear decay of the stock of pollution (Sinclair 1992, Ulph and Ulph 1994,
Farzin 1996, Hoel and Kverndokk 1996). Although assuming linear decay makes the dynamic
modeling of stock pollutants more tractable, only few natural processes, such as radioactive
decay, can be characterized in such a manner.1 The great majority of environmental processes
are likely to be nonlinear in the decay of the stock pollutant, and non-linear decay is the
only realistic representation of biogeochemical cycles that include both positive and negative
feedbacks (Joos et al., 1996).
Several authors, including Pezzey (1996) and Toman and Withagen (2000), who have
explored the issues of pollution accumulation and assimilation present the possibility that
decay of the stock pollutant may, at diﬀerent levels of the stock, be initially increasing and
then decreasing. For instance, increased concentrations of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
may initially increase the assimilative capacity of the environment to uptake carbon due to
carbon fertilization, but further increases in GHG emissions that lead to even higher GHG
concentrations and higher surface temperatures may eventually lead to plant die oﬀst h a t
could ultimately reduce carbon uptake. Climate change also serves as a useful illustration of
2the potential of both global stock externalities (increased probability of climate change due
to increased atmospheric concentrations of GHGs) and local ￿ow externalities (reduced air
quality from simultaneous emission of joint pollutants, such as volatile organic compounds)
to arise from the same pollution source. To further explore these issues we present an example
of the ￿more is less￿ result using a stylistic model of climate change, but ￿rst we present a
dynamic model that includes both stock and ￿ow externalities and derive theoretical results.
2 A Model of Production with Stock and Flow Externalities
We present a dynamic model that incorporates both stock and ￿ow externalities in produc-
tion. We assume that the objective is to maximize welfare (W), de￿ned as the discounted
present value of social utility, and which is a function of the stock of pollution (a)a n dt h e
production of a good (x). Utility is de￿ned as the sum of consumer and producer surplus,
adjusted for ￿ow externalities, less the aﬀect of the stock externality de￿ned by D(a), where





s(z)]dz − D(a) ≡ Π(x) − D(a)
where x is quantity produced, P is the inverse demand, and Cs is the social marginal cost
of production.2
A dynamic constraint governs the change in the stock of pollution,
. a, and is determined by
the instantaneous increase in pollution γx, which is proportional to production x by a factor
γ, and the decay of the stock of pollution, d(a), which might be increasing or decreasing in
a, depending upon the level of a.3 The ￿ow externality, τf, is the instantaneous externality
which arises at the time the pollution is emitted. By de￿nition, the marginal cost associated
with the ￿ow externality plus the private marginal cost of production, Cp(x), equals the
social marginal cost of production Cs(x), thus τf ≡ Cs − Cp.
Our analysis examines the case without discounting because, if the counterintuitive ￿more
is less￿ occurs at a zero discount rate, it will also hold true with a positive discount rate.
Indeed, for the right pro￿le we can always ￿nd a discount rate suﬃciently high for the
counterintuitive case to occur.




U(v(t))dt, v(t) ≡ (a(t),x(t)) ∈ R ￿ X
where X =[ 0 ,B] is a given bounded interval, and W is maximized subject to the following
dynamic constraint and initial condition:
œ a(t)=x(t) − d(a(t)),a (0) = a0, (1)
where a0 is the initial level of the stock pollutant.
We assume that a long-term steady state is desirable and thus solve for processes v ∈ V,
where
V = V [R ￿ X],t →∞ lima(t)=a
∗. (2)
3In this case, V represents the set of (a(t),x(t)) such that a is continuously diﬀerentiable,
and x is continuous and piecewise diﬀerentiable.
To develop the model further, we de￿ne the following set of admissible processes in De￿-
nitions 1 and 2 in the appendix. Under these de￿nitions, the optimal control problem is to
determine the feedback rule x(a)t h a ts o l v e sv ∈ AmaxW. If W is not bounded from above,
we provide an alternative de￿nition of optimality called Catching Up (CU) or Overtaking
(OT) optimality that is used to distinguish possible unbounded value functions. CU or OT
optimality formalizes the idea that, without discounting, one dollar a day forever is less than
two dollars a day forever although both sums are in￿nite.
Our model may represent either a single ￿rm in a competitive world, or an entire com-
petitive industry. In the absence of intervention, market equilibrium requires that P = Cp,
where private marginal cost is strictly increasing in x, and an equilibrium price and quantity
of x can be de￿ned for any level a.I f a is a constant, the solution collapses to the stan-
dard result of static models with ￿ow externalities, namely that welfare is maximized when
P = Cs.
To demonstrate the counterintuitive or ￿more is less￿ result we ￿rst specify key variables
de￿ned formally in De￿nitions 3 and 4 of the Appendix. In particular, we introduce a
sustainable utility rate, S,d e ￿ned as S(a)=Π(d(a)) − D(a) and a total utility rate, K,
de￿ned as K(a,x)=Π(x)−D(a)+Π0(x)•[d(a) − x]. The total utility rate, K(a,x), has the
same value as the Hamiltonian along an optimal path but the costate is replaced by −Π 0(x).
These de￿nitions are required to state and prove Theorem 1, given in the appendix, that
shows that the long-term steady-state (a∗,x ∗ = d(a∗)) is a saddle point for K(a,x)a n di s
determined by S0(a∗)=0 .
Using the above result, we can formally state Proposition 1, and which is proved in the
appendix, to characterize the feedback solution and optimal production path to our dynamic
problem.4
Proposition 1 The optimal steady state is to the left of b a =m a x d(a).T h e s e p a r a t r i x
part of the feedback solution is strictly decreasing to the right of b a. If the total utility rate,
K(a,x), is quasi-concave on the set L de￿ned by {(a,x):a>a ∗,0 <x<x ∗,x<d(a)} then
the separatrix part of the feedback solution is concave below d(a).
To derive the counterintuitive or ￿more is less￿ result using a system of taxes we must
next write the Hamiltonian for the dynamic optimization problem
H(a,x,λ)=U(a,x)+λ[x − d(a)] (3)
where λ is the costate variable for the stock of pollution, a.T h ev a r i a b l eλ also represents
the shadow cost and is given by
−λ = U
0(x).
The corrective tax, ignoring the ￿ow externality, is thus
σ(x)=−λ = Π
0(x)
on the optimal path x(a). Alternatively, we can rewrite the σ tax as
σ = P − C




4In other words, and as previously shown by Wirl (1994) and Farzin (1996), the optimal
corrective tax exceeds, in the presence of stock and ￿ow externalities, the shadow cost of
pollution. Thus, the tax which corrects for both ￿ow and stock externalities, de￿ned as τ,
is the diﬀerence between the consumer price and producer price, τ(x)=P(x) − Cp(x), and
can be calculated at both the ￿rm and industry level. As a result,
τ(x)=σ(x)+τf(x), (4)
and which holds true at both the optimal steady state and on the path to the steady state.
We can now compare σ and τ corrective taxes and their aﬀect on production, emissions and
pollution to show the counterinuitive result of ￿more is less￿ if ￿ow externalities are ignored
in the determination of an optimal set of emissions taxes.
3 The Eﬀects of Ignoring Flow Externalities
At any given pollution level, σ must be lower than τ because σ ignores the ￿ow externality.
As a result, we would expect that a σ-tax would be associated with more pollution, more
production and a lower tax payment at all times. In fact, because emissions diﬀer with the τ
and σ taxes, the time path of pollution will also diﬀer and, thus, the possibility exists that σ
may lead to a steady state with more aggregate pollution but, surprisingly, less production
and a higher tax level.
To derive the time path of a with the σ-tax, and which ignores the ￿ow externality, we
must ￿rst derive the feedback rule for production that corresponds to σ.I f w e d e ￿ne the
stock-externality part of the optimal tax as σ(x(a)), for any given a-level, we can obtain a
new market equilibrium, y,d e ￿ned by
τ(y)=σ(x(a)). (5)
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. Expression (5) is in terms of only y and a,a n d
c a nb eu s e dt os o l v ef o ry as a function of a. Thus we obtain new feedback rule, y(a) >x (a),
and the time path of a can be given by
œ a = y(a) − d(a).
This result is stated formally in the following proposition, and proved in the appendix.
Proposition 2 The σ-tax yields a production that is always higher than the optimal, x,f o r
a given level of the stock pollution, except for very high pollution levels where both taxes may
choke the production.
The feedback rule based on σ leads to a diﬀerent steady state with a higher a.T h i ss t e a d y
state, a#, can be found by substituting y = d(a)i n t o( 5 ) :
τ(d(a)) = σ(x(a))
which eventually yields a# >a ∗. At the steady state, y# = d(a#), which can be compared
with x∗ = d(a∗). The counterintuitive or ￿more is less￿ result, stated formally in de￿nition
55 of the appendix, is a steady state where y(a#) <x (a∗), and thus σ > τ, In other words,
the tax that ignores the ￿ow externality ultimately results in lower production and higher
tax than the optimal corrective tax. The counterintuitive or ￿more is less￿ result, however,
can only occur if d(a) is non-linear and non-monotone, as stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If the decay-function, d(a), is monotonically increasing, the σ tax will always
lead to a steady state with higher production and lower tax than the τ tax.
The intuition behind the counterintuitive result is that, starting from the same initial
situation, a tax that ignores the ￿ow externality results in higher production and higher
emissions over time than if the ￿ow externality were corrected for in an optimal tax. Thus,
over time, the σ tax results in a higher level of cumulative pollution or emissions. At the
steady state, however, current emissions must equal the rate of decay of the emissions. Thus
if the rate of decay decreases with the level of pollution, as we might expect with many
natural processes, then for a suﬃciently high stock pollution level the lower rate of decay
must be compensated by a higher tax at the steady state. Thus, the σ tax at the steady state
that only corrects for the stock externality may be higher than the τ tax that corrects for
both the ￿ow and stock externality. Moreover, at the steady state the τ tax that corrects for
both externalities will result in a higher output and lower cumulative emissions (less decay)
than the σ tax that ignores the ￿ow externality.
For completeness, we can specify the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the counter-
intuitive case to occur. First, we de￿ne the steady state corresponding to τ as (a∗,x ∗)a n d
a∗∗ as the solution of x∗ = d(a)f o ra>a ∗ if it exists, and a∗∗ = ∞ otherwise. In this
case, a∗∗ is a knife-edge case because it corresponds to the level of accumulated pollution at
which production (and taxes) are exactly the same, whether we are to the left or right of
the maximum of the decay function. This point is shown in Figure 2.
We can now de￿ne the inequality at the steady state between the σ tax that ignores the
￿ow externality and the τ tax that corrects for both the ￿ow and stock externalities, given
that the σ tax has a higher stock of pollution than the τ tax at the steady state.
Proposition 4 If d(a) is quasi-concave, (a∗,x ∗) is the steady state corresponding to τ and
(a#,y #) is the steady state corresponding to σ,t h e nσ(y#) > τ(x∗) iﬀ a# >a ∗∗.
Figure 2 illustrates the two cases with two diﬀerent decay functions￿a case where the
counterintuitive or ￿more is less￿ result occurs (the left-hand panel) and a case in which
it does not (the right-hand panel). When comparing the cases in Figure 2, note that in
a-space the shadow price is the same whether we use x or y. By contrast, in time space the
development of the shadow price will diﬀer for the two policies.
From the left-hand panel in Figure 2 we can verify the eﬀects of discounting. Discounting
implies a less conservative policy and will shift the optimal paths to the right. Thus if the
counterintuitive case holds for a given discount rate, such as zero, it must also hold true for
a higher discount rate. In fact, if a∗∗ < ∞, it will always be possible to ￿nd a discount rate
which is suﬃciently high for the counterintuitive case to occur.
We are now able to derive the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the counterintuitive
or ￿more is less￿ result to occur. First, we note that the values a∗ and a∗∗ can be found
6without solving the complete problem, or solving any diﬀerential equations. Thus, we can
assume the following quantities are known:




M = X ∈ Jmin[−Π
00(x)], M = X ∈ Jmax[−Π
00(x)]
Given the above, the necessary condition for the ￿more is less￿ result is stated by Propo-
s i t i o n5 ,a n dp r o v e di nt h ea p p e n d i x .




is a necessary condition for the counterintuitive
case to occur for cases covered by Theorem 1 (see Appendix).
The economic interpretation of Proposition 5 is that the left-hand side, ∆D∗, is interpreted
as the diﬀerence in damage associated with being at a∗∗ instead of a∗. The right-hand side
of the inequality is interpreted as the tax payment associated with the ￿ow externality
when staying at a#. The intuition behind this proposition is that if the damage diﬀerence
associated with the knife-edge case is less than the initial ￿ow-tax when jumping from the
steady state a# to the optimal path x(a#), then the counterintuitive case may occur.
The suﬃcient condition for the counterintuitive result to occur is provided by Proposition
6 ,a n dp r o v e di nt h ea p p e n d i x .
Proposition 6 If there exists a z such that 0 <z<x ∗ and if τF = x ∈ Nmin[τf(x)] where
N =[ z,x∗] ⊆ J ⊆ X, then 2M
2∆D∗ <M τ2
f is suﬃcient for the counterintuitive case to
occur for cases covered by Theorem 1 (see Appendix).
Proposition 6 states that if the damage diﬀerence associated with the knife-edge case
is less than a given value, than the counterintuitive case must occur. To illustrate the
potential implications of the result, and to show how to derive the optimal corrective tax in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fs t o c ka n d￿ow externalities, we present an example from the climate change
literature.
4 ￿More is Less￿: A Climate Change Example
The possibility that ignoring the ￿ow externality may eventually reduce production and
increase tax payments can be illustrated using a numerical simulation from the climate
change literature. The example shows that the ￿more is less￿ result is not only a theoretical
possibility, but may also occur in practice.
The parameters used in the model de￿ned below are stylized, but are derived from the
literature on climate change and are used to illustrate the theoretical results. The model
speci￿es linear demand and linear marginal cost functions and a quadratic damage function.
We assume current emissions of CO2 a r e2 2g i g at o n n e s( G t - C O 2), which is the private
market equilibrium in our model when marginal costs are normalized to one, and production
is measured as emissions. The cumulative anthropogenic emissions of CO2, less decay, are
assumed to be 625 Gt-CO2 above the pre-industrial level. In other words, a is normalized
to the pre-industrial level such that d(0) = D(a) = 0. The pre-industrial level is a natural
7equilibrium without emissions, and at this level there is no damage associated with the
cumulative carbon emissions. The climate change model is given below:
P(x)=1 5 − 0.64 • x,
C
p(x)=1 + 0 .05 • x,
C
s(x)=1 + 0 .12 • x,
γx = x, D(a)=0 .000005 • a
2,
d(a)=m a x ( 0 ,21 • exp
³
−(a − 600)




The aggregate decay function, d(a), for atmospheric carbon is the subject of intense study
and debate. We simply use a non-monotone function to illustrate the relative eﬀects of σ and
τ taxes. For illustrative purposes, we assume that today￿s decay is just above the maximum
decay and which implies the eﬀects of global warming already have started.
With the exception of Wirl (1994) and Farzin (1996), existing models (such as Sinclair
1992, 1994; Ulph and Ulph 1994) do not explicity consider ￿ow externalities as a function of
the current level of emissions. Of these models, only Farzin and Tahnoven (1996) examine the
eﬀect of diﬀerent rates of uptake of carbon in the atmosphere on the time paths of corrective
taxes, but they ignore the ￿ow externalities associated with GHG emissions. A feature
of their model, shared with ours, is that they explicitly consider the aﬀect of the decay
function on their results. In their case, they develop their results using a decay function
that is analogous to non-autonomous linear decay. Assuming multiple carbon stocks, each
with diﬀerent but constant rates of decay, they ￿nd that for carbon levels in excess of pre-
industrial levels, the corrective tax may be decreasing or U-shaped over time. They conclude
that the optimal carbon tax is ￿•••sensitive to the submodel describing the accumulation of
atmospheric CO2.￿ (Farzin and Tahvonen 1996, p. 533).
The speci￿cation of demand and supply functions are based on some assumptions about
elasticities. If current production is 22, this implies a demand elasticity of -0.16 and a
supply elasticity of 1.9. This is in accordance with Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) who
state that short-term demand elasticities are about one tenth of the long-term, and probably
lie between -0.1 and -0.2. As this model is dynamic and adaptive, only short-term elasticities
are of interest. The supply elasticity is in accordance with Burniaux et al. (1992) who state
that supply elasticities from countries within OPEC vary between one and three.
The parameters above imply Π(x)=1 4•x−0.38•x2, and, hence, the corrective taxes are
τ(x)=1 4 − 0.69 • x,
σ(x)=1 4 − 0.76 • x,
τf =0 .07 • x.
Under this numerical speci￿cation, we obtain the following quantities:
b =1 7 .68 a∗∗ = 638.5 ∆D∗ =0 .462
M =0 .76 M =0 .76
8Thus, the steady states resulting from τ(x)v e r s u sσ(x)a r e
a∗ = 561.5 x∗ =1 7 .52 τ(x∗)=1 .91,
a# =6 6 9 .3 y# =1 7 .17 σ(y#)=2 .15.
The counterintuitive result corresponds with the suﬃciency criterion given in Proposition
6, namely, 2M
2∆D∗ <Mτ2
f is ful￿lled in the region 11.97 <x<x ∗. In other words, starting
at the same initial condition, a carbon tax that ignores ￿ow externalities will initially be
lower than a tax that accounts for both the stock and ￿ow externalities. However, at the
steady state, the optimal carbon tax rate (τ) will be lower, the output will be higher and
the cumulative carbon emissions (less decay) will be lower than the σ tax that ignores the
￿ow externalities. Thus, by incorporating non-monotone decay in the pollution stock in a
model of GHG emissions, which better represents the actual physical processes, we show the
importance of accounting for both stock and ￿ow externalities. Moreover, in contrast to the
accepted view that ￿ow externalities aﬀect only transient consumption (Wirl 1994), we ￿nd
that a failure to consider ￿ow externalities in a model of GHG emissions may aﬀect both
the time paths and steady states of production, emissions, and taxes.
The example illustrates the large potential diﬀerences that may arise in steady-state
cumulative emissions depending upon whether the corrective tax does, or does not, ignore
the ￿ow externalities associated GHG emissions. For instance, at the steady state, cumulative
carbon emissions (less decay) are almost 20 percent higher when ￿ow externalities are ignored
than when both ￿ow and stock externalities are corrected for in a tax. The ￿more is less￿
result potentially has signi￿cant policy implications for the setting of targets under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and indeed for all regulators
wishing to address stock externalities. In particular, if corrective taxes and emission targets
are set at too low a level, or if decision-makers ignore the transitory environmental costs
associated with GHG emissions, then such corrective policies could result in lower world
GDP, higher concentrations of GHGs and higher tax payments than if optimal taxes that
consider both the stock and ￿ow externalities were applied.
5 Concluding Remarks
Using a dynamic model with both ￿ow and stock externalities and non-monotone decay of the
stock pollutant, we prove the possibility that, at the steady state, an optimal corrective tax
may result in less total emissions, but also lower tax payments, than a corrective tax which
ignores ￿ow externalities. A similar result also applies in the absence of a ￿ow externality.
If a tax to correct a stock externality is set at too low a level then, at the steady state, such
a tax may result in both higher cumulative emissions (less decay) and higher tax payments
than if the optimal corrective tax were applied from the initial period.
The intuition for the counterintuitive or ￿more is less￿ result is that ignoring the ￿ow
externality, or setting too low corrective tax for a stock externality, results in initially higher
production and higher emissions. Over time, this leads to a higher cumulative level of the
stock pollutant and eventually, depending the nature of decay of the stock pollutant, the tax
payments may become higher than if the optimal tax was applied from the beginning period.
9In order to arrive at a steady state, emissions of the stock pollutant must equal the decay
of the stock pollutant, but if the decay of the stock of pollution decreases with the level
of the stock then, for suﬃciently high pollution levels, the reduced decay associated with a
higher level of the pollution stock must be compensated for by lower production. Thus, at
the steady state, the corrective tax that ignores the ￿ow externality, or is set at too low a
level, may result in higher tax payments than the optimal corrective tax and will also have
a higher steady-state level of the stock of pollution and a lower level of output.
The ￿more is less￿ result provides important insights for corrective tax policies where
there exist both stock and ￿ow externalities. The paper suggests that decision makers that
fail to consider ￿ow externalities, or set their emission target reductions or corrective taxes
at too low a level in the presence of stock externalities, risk imposing signi￿cant transitory
and permanent costs in terms of higher future tax payments, higher steady-state levels of
the stock pollution and lower future output.
10Appendix
De￿nition 1 The set of admissible processes, A,i sd e ￿ned as all processes that satisfy (1)
and (2).
De￿nition 2 The usual assumptions about the input functions are:
1. Π,Dand d are C2-functions in their arguments whenever the arguments are positive.
2. D : R → R+ is strictly increasing and convex for positive arguments, and identically equal
to zero for non-positive arguments. The state a =0is, by de￿nition, a steady state without
emissions and can be interpreted as the preindustrial level, that is d(0) = 0 and D(0) = 0.
No damage is associated with the preindustrial level.
3. Π : X → R+ is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
4. d : R → R+ is strictly increasing for 0 <a<b a and strictly decreasing for a>b a.F u r t h e r
a → 0+lim[Π0(d(a)) • d0(a) − D0(a)] > 0.
De￿nition 3 Sustainable utility rate, S,i sd e ￿ned as the utility obtained when a is ￿xed at
certain level and given by S(a)=Π(d(a)) − D(a)
De￿nition 4 Total utility rate, K,i sd e ￿ned as K(a,x)=Π(x)−D(a)+Π0(x)•[d(a) − x].
De￿nition 5 The counterintuitive case: The case where σ leads to a steady state where
y(a#) <x (a∗), and hence σ > τ, that is a steady state with lower production and higher tax,
is called the counterintuitive (￿more is less￿) case.
Statement and Proof of Theorem ??
Theorem 1 The Catching￿Up (CU) optimal production for the problem v ∈ ACU − optW
where ∂2
∂a2K(a,x) < 0 on R ￿ X,i sg i v e nb y
x(a)=m a x ( 0 ,z(a)) where K(a,z(a)) = maxS(a)=S(a
∗). (7)
The long-term steady-state (a∗,x ∗ = d(a∗)) is a saddle point for K(a,x) and is determined
by S0(a∗)=0 .
The feedback solution given by (7) satis￿es all the conditions in the Mangasarin suﬃciency
theorem for the Catching-Up optimality as stated in theorem 3.13 in Seierstad and Syds￿ther
(1987). The usual assumptions in De￿nition 2 ensure the regularity. The Hamiltonian for
our problem, H(a,x,λ)=Π(x) − D(a)+λ • (x − d(a)), is conserved since time does not
enter the problem explicitly, i.e., H(a,x,λ)=K0 (constant) In the equilibrium we have
K0 = H(a,d(a),λ)=S(a)a n dK0 must be chosen as the global maximum of the sustainable
utility rate S(a). The assumptions done are suﬃcient to ensure that S(a) atains its global
maximum in a critical point a∗. This can be seen from the usual assumption which states
that S 0(0+) > 0a n dS 0(a) < 0 for a ≥ b a =a r g m a x d(a) and the implied regularity
of the sustainable utility rate. Hence a∗ is to the left of b a. The strict concavity of Π and
∂2K(a,x)/∂a2 < 0i ss u ﬃcient to ensure that H(•) is strictly concave in (a,x). Hence the CU-
optimal problem has the unique solution given by the feedback expression implicitly de￿ned
in (7). This solution is constructed by the separatrix solution going into the equilibrium
11point (having λ = −Π 0(x(a)) < 0) and the corner solution x = 0 when the separatrix yields
a negative production. The optimal Hamiltonian, H(•), is equal in value to the total utility
rate K(•) on the separatrix part of the feedback solution.
The new condition imposed by the Catching-Up optimality is given by t →∞ liminfλ(t)•
[A(t) − a(t)] ≥ 0. The optimal policy is implies a = a(t) and any other admissible policy
implies a = A(t). This CU-condition is trivial and the limit is zero due to the fact that the
all admissible solutions end up in a∗ and |λ| = |Π 0(x)| is bounded.
In our case we can show that the feedback solution is stronger than CU optimal. Indeed








In this case, (a,x) represents the separatrix solution and (A,y) represents other admissible
solutions. These must satisfy K(A,y)=K0 <S ∗ =m a x S(a) in order to yield a steady






















∗ − K0) • t − Ψ ≥ 0,t ≥ t0.
where we can choose Ψ =
R a∗
a0 {Π0(x(s)) + Π0(y(s))}ds and t0 suﬃciently large.
Proof of Proposition 1
Theorem 1 implies S0(a∗)=Π0(d(a∗))d0(a∗) − D0(a∗) = 0, which implies that d 0(a∗) > 0.
Therefore the feedback intersects with d(a) to the left of its maximum. Diﬀerentiating
K(a,x)=S∗ yields Π00 • (d − x) • x0 = D0 − Π0 • d0.T o t h e r i g h t o f b a =m a x d we have
d − x>0a n dd0 < 0 and the monotonicity of x0 follows now from the concavity of Π.
















Quasi-concavity implies that the right-hand side is non-negative and ∂K
∂x < 0o nL.
Proof of Proposition 2
As τ(y)=σ(y)+τf(y)=σ(x) > σ(y), and as σ = Ux is strictly decreasing, the proposition
is proved for all pollution levels associated with positive production, i.e. a ≤ e a and K(e a,0) =
S∗.
12Proof of Proposition 3
Steady states are, by de￿nition, intersections between the d(a)-curve and the production
feedback-paths x(a)a n dy(a). Since y(a)i sn o tl o w e rt h a nx(a), the intersection between
y(a) and an increasing d(a)-curve will always imply that y(a)i sh i g h e rt h a nx(a)i ns t e a d y
state.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of this proposition can be seen directly from Figure 2. This case occurs if and
only if x(a) intersects with d at a higher value than y(a). Quasi-concavity of d(a) implies
that this occurs if and only if a# >a ∗∗.
Proof of Proposition 5
The steady state resulting from a σ-tax is denoted (a#,y #). As S is concave, S(a∗∗) ≥ S(a#)
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the counterintuitive case to occur (see Proposition
4). The concavity of the sustainable utility rate is a direct consequence of the concavity of
Π and ∂2
∂a2K(a,x) < 0.


































is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the counterintuitive case not to occur. The lower




















is necessary for the counterintuitive case to occur.
Proof of Proposition 6
Let δ denote the left-hand side of equation (8). It will be shown that this proposition implies
δ > 0. Recalling σ(x)=Π0(x)e q u a t i o n s( 4 )a n d( 8 )i m p l y
∆D












































































It follows immediately that
∆D


















If ∆D∗ is smaller than the right-hand side, then this is suﬃcient for δ > 0 and hence for the
counterintuitive case to occur. The right-hand side requires that (a#,y#) has been solved
and can be ensured by securing that ∆D∗ is less than the smallest value that the right-hand
side may take in the interval of interest.
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16Endnotes:
1. Papers that do use a nonlinear decay function include Forster (1975) and Tahvonen and
Salo (1996).
2. For conciseness, functional dependence of the variables is suppressed in the text.
3. We de￿ne γ ≡ 1 which is equivalent to measuring a and x in the same units.
4. This expression for the optimal tax as a feedback control law can also be found in Sandal
and Steinshamn (1998).
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